Saturday, August 29, 2015

British Columbia Law Institute Seeks Comments on New and Emerging Issues for Update to Pension Division Question and Answer Materials


The British Columbia Law Institute published the first edition of its book Questions and Answers About Pension Division on the Breakdown of a Relationship in British Columba in 1996.The third edition was published in 2013, and is available here.

The British Columbia Law Institute is now seeking input for the fourth edition. I will quote the press release:

The law on pension division is rapidly evolving. BCLI is working to keep pace with it by developing the fourth edition of its popular Questions and Answers on Pension Division at the Breakdown of a Relationship resource.

Do you have a question about the new Pension Benefits Standards Act or its interaction with the Family Law Act?

Do you have comments about a particular area of the law you would like to see explained in more detail in the 2016 update?

This new update will examine the upcoming changes to pension benefits standards in the new Pension Benefits Standards Act, explore the effects of ancillary provisions in the Family Law Act, as well as review developments in the common law since its last publication in March 2013. This will be the fourth edition of the Q & A materials – an ongoing project dating back to March 1996.

Thomas G. Anderson, QC, a specialist in pension law, particularly dealing with dividing entitlement when a relationship ends, is once again working closely with the BCLI to perform this update. He noted, “In my view, this is an extremely valuable project.  When a relationship ends, often the most valuable assets the parties possess are their retirement benefits.  It's important for the Q & A materials to continue to serve as an up-to-date practice resource for the BC legal community, other professionals involved in pensions and benefits, and members of the general public.”

The final publication is expected to be available at www.bcli.org in Spring 2016.

BCLI is currently receiving submissions, questions, and comments about suggested updates for the fourth edition of the Q & A materials. BCLI is accepting submissions at pensiondivision@bcli.org until 30 October 2015.

The British Columbia Law Institute strives to be a leader in law reform by carrying out the best in scholarly law-reform research and writing and the best in outreach relating to law reform.


Contact: Alexandre Blondin
Research Lawyer
(604) 822 0981
ablondin@bcli.org

Sunday, August 23, 2015

Gifts Void Against Public Policy: McCorkill Estate


The usual rule in Canada is that a will-maker may leave wealth to whom he or she chooses. This is subject to claims of a spouse or children under various wills variation or dependent relief legislation, which varies from province to province, but apart from such legislation, it is generally true that a will-maker my choose his or her beneficiaries.
Though not common, there is another exception to the usual rule. A court may find a gift to be void as being contrary to public policy.

Harry Robert McCorkill, who died on February 20, 2004, left his estate to the National Alliance, a white supremacist organization based in the United States.
His sister challenged the gift on the grounds that it was against public policy. If successful, she and her brother would inherit the estate as Harry McCorkill’s next-of-kin (he did not have a spouse or children).

Mr. Justice Grant of the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench, in McCorkill v. Streed, 2014 NBQB 148 (CanLii)  reviewed the National Alliance foundational documents as well as various publications, which he described “as racist, white supremacist and hate-inspired.  They are disgusting, repugnant and revolting.” He found that the organization's communications were hate propaganda, and as such violated the Criminal Code of Canada.
Before concluding that the National Alliance’s activities did offend public policy, Mr. Justice Grant set out the authorities dealing with gifts that are void as against public policy as follows:

[58]   What constitutes public policy is a question that has been considered in many cases. In the case of Re: Wishart Estate (No. 2) 1992 CanLii 2679 (NBQB); (1993) 1992 CanLII 2679 (NB QB), 129 NBR (2d) 397 Riordon, J. considered whether or not a direction in a will to destroy four horses violated public policy. He quoted extensively from the Missouri case of Eyerman et al v Mercantile Trust Co. N.A. et al 524 S.W.2d 210 including the following:
The term ‘public policy’ cannot be comprehensively defined in specific terms but the phrase ‘against public policy’ has been characterized as that which conflicts with the morals of the time and contravenes any established interest of society.  Acts are said to be against public policy ‘when the law refuses to enforce or recognize them, on the ground that they have a mischievous tendency, so as to be injurious to the interests of the state, apart from illegality or immorality’.  Dille v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 355 Mo. 436; 196 S.W. 2d 615, 620 (1946); Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W. 2d 808, 812 (Mo. banc 1959).
[59]   In Canada Trust Co. v. Ontario Human Rights Commission 1990 CanLII 6849 (ON CA), [1990] O.J. No. 615 (O.C.A.) the court considered whether a trust document establishing a charitable trust based on white supremacy, religious supremacy, racism and sexism violated public policy. Writing for the majority, Robins, J.A. stated at paragraph 34:
34.     Viewing this trust document as a whole, does it violate public policy?  In answering that question, I am not unmindful of the adage that “public policy is an unruly horse” or of the admonition that public policy “should be invoked only in clear cases, in which the harm to the public is substantially incontestable, and does not depend on the idiosyncratic inferences of a few judicial minds”: Re Millar, 1937 CanLII 10 (SCC), [1938] S.C.R. 1,  [1938] 1 D.L.R. 65 [per Crocket J., quoting Lord Aitkin in Fender v. Mildmay, [1937] 3 All E.R. 402, at p. 13 S.C.R.].  I have regard also to the observation of Professor D.W.M. Waters in his text on the Law of Trusts in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1984), at p. 240 to the effect that:
The courts have always recognized that to declare a disposition of property void on the ground that the object is intended to contravene, or has the effect of contravening public policy, is to take a serious step.  There is the danger that the judge will tend to impose his own values rather than those values which are commonly agreed upon in society and, while the evolution of the common law is bound to reflect contemporary ideas on the interests of society, the courts also feel that it is largely the duty of the legislative body to enact law in such matters, proceeding as such a body does by the process of debate and vote.
Nonetheless, there are cases where the interests of society require the court’s intervention on the grounds of public policy. 
[60]   In the case of Re Estate of Charles Millar, Deceased 1937 CanLII 10 (SCC), [1938] S.C.R. 1 Duff C.J. stated at p. 4:
It is the duty of the courts to give effect to contracts and testamentary dispositions according to the settled rules and principles of law, since we are under a reign of law; but there are cases in which rules of law cannot have their normal operation because the law itself recognizes some paramount consideration of public policy which over-rides the interest and what otherwise would be the rights and powers of the individual.  It is, in our opinion, important not to forget that it is in this way, in derogation of the rights and powers of private persons, as they would otherwise be ascertained by principles of law, that the principle of public policy operates.
[61]   Public policy, then, embodies the “interests of society” as expressed in the morals of the time, the common law and legislation. In respect to the latter in Canada Trust Co., supra., Tarnopolsky, J.A. stated at paras. 92-94:
92      Public policy is not determined by reference to only one statute or even one province, but is gleaned from a variety of sources, including provincial and federal statutes, official declarations of government policy and the Constitution.  The public policy against discrimination is reflected in the anti-discrimination laws of every jurisdiction in Canada.  These have been given a special status by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., 1985 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, 52 O.R. (2d) 799 (note), 17 Admin. L.R. 89, 9 C.C.E.L. 185, 7 C.H.R.R. D/3102, 86 C.L.L.C. Paragraph17, 002, 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321, [1986] D.L.Q. 89 (note), 64 N.R. 161, 12 O.A.C. 241, at p. 547 S.C.R., p. 329 D.L.R. 
The accepted rules of construction are flexible enough to enable the Court to recognize in the construction of a human rights code the special nature and purpose of the enactment (see Lamer J. in Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Heerspink, 1982 CanLII 27 (SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 145 at pp. 157-58), and give to it an interpretation which will advance its broad purposes.  Legislation of this type is of a special nature, not quite constitutional, but certainly more than the ordinary – and it is for the courts to seek out its purpose and give it effect.
93      In addition, equality rights “without discrimination” are now enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in s. 15; the equal rights of men and women are reinforced in s. 28; and the protection and enhancement of our multicultural heritage is provided for in s. 27.
94      Finally, the world community has made anti-discrimination a matter of public policy in specific conventions like the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), G.A. Res. 2106 A (XX), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), G.A. Res. 34/180, as well as Articles 2, 3, 25 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), all three of which international instruments have been ratified by Canada with the unanimous consent of all the provinces.  It would be nonsensical to pursue every one of these domestic and international instruments to see whether the public policy invalidity is restricted to any particular activity or service or facility.   
Next Mr. Justice Grant considered whether it was sufficient for the gift to be to an organization whose activities were against public policy to declare the gift void. In contrast to most of the cases in which a gift or a condition to a gift is found to be void as against public policy, Mr. McCorkill’s will does not expressly provide that the funds in his estate are to be used to promote an object (in this case hate propaganda) that is against public policy. One may make a valid gift in a will to a bad person, even one who has committed horrendous crimes.
Mr. Justice Grant distinguished between a gift to a person who has committed a crime, and an organization whose very purpose is contrary to public policy. He wrote:
[72]   While the jurisprudence on voiding bequests on the grounds of public policy tends to deal with conditions attached to specific bequests, in my opinion the facts of this case are so strong that they render this case indistinguishable from those. 
[73]   Unlike most beneficiaries, the National Alliance has foundational documents which state its purposes.  Moreover, those purposes have been expanded upon, explained and disseminated in various forms of media by the NA since its inception.  They consistently show that the National Alliance stands for principles and policies, as well as the means to implement them, that are both illegal and contrary to public policy in Canada.  If the organization has changed in these respects since its inception then it was incumbent upon the respondent, particularly through the evidence of Erich Gliebe, the current President of the National Alliance, to demonstrate that in this application.  It has not done so.
[74]   The facts of this case can be distinguished from most other cases because in most cases, a beneficiary of an estate does not “stand for” something identifiable. They don’t have foundational documents.  A drug dealer does not “stand for” dealing drugs.  He or she may have a criminal record of doing that but that does not mean that that is what they stand for. Their crimes are not the purpose for which they exist, their raison d’ĂȘtre.
Accordingly, the gift to the National Alliance is void. In the result, the estate will go to Mr. McCorkill’s next-of-kin. The New Brunswick Court of Appeal upheld Mr. Justice Grant’s decision, (2015 NBCA 50(Canlii).
Post Script

The quotations in the reasons for judgment from the National Alliance publications are bound to make the strongest of stomachs turn. But one line caused me to giggle. In describing its “Aryan values,” one document says:
In specific terms, this means a society in which young men and women gather to revel with polkas or waltzes, reels or jigs or any other White dances, but never to undulate or jerk to [adjective omitted]… jazz or rock rhythms. …
I have nothing against polkas or waltzes (and I am not sure what reels or jigs are) but I cannot conceive of my world without jazz.

Saturday, August 15, 2015

Mediation


I spend a great deal of my time writing about decided-estate-litigation-court cases. Yet, in my experience the vast majority of disputes are settled through negotiation, and increasingly through mediation. I attend far more mediations than trials. I believe many other lawyers who practice in this area of law have similar experiences.
But because mediations are confidential, I cannot write about the facts, negotiations, or the outcomes. They are not reported like trials. I only know about the ones I attend, and it would be a breach of my obligations of confidentiality for me to write about those.

Furthermore, mediation is not frequently discussed in reported court decisions.
There is, however,  a recent court decision in which Mr. Justice Kent describes the merits of the mediation process. The case is Matsqui First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 BCSC 1409. The dispute concerns whether the Matsqui have a constitutional right to fish for salmon for domestic purpose in an area of the Fraser River and, if so, whether the Federal Government is infringing on those rights.

The Matsqui First Nation delivered a Notice to Mediate pursuant to the Notice to Mediate (General) Regulation. The Federal Government did not consider the dispute amenable to mediation, and applied to court for an order exempting it from mediation. To succeed, the Government would need to establish that mediation would be “materially impracticable or unfair.”
In reaching his decision that the Federal Government ought not be exempted, Mr. Justice Kent summarized many of the merits of mediation in which he quotes a decision from the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, IBM CanadaLimited v. Kossovan, 2011 ABQB 621 (CanLii):

[16]         The Kossovan case, supra, also made various observations about the alternative dispute resolution process which may be apposite here:

[39]      It is a fallacy to think that the outcome of a [mediation] will always result in a substantial compromise to one’s initial position. While one of [the] objects of [alternate] dispute resolution is to get both parties to “move” from their initial positions to one which they can mutually accept, the ultimate objective is achievement of a judicious outcome that all parties can live with, put behind them and move on.
...
[41]      A number of plaintiffs enter into the litigation process, believing [in the justness of their cause and] that they are entitled to recover the full amount of their claim. Positions may be based on what they have been told by counsel, personal principles, or … corporate direction. Yet despite this belief successful settlements are often reached. Parties may be persuaded to resolve the dispute once the weaknesses in their own case is revealed to them, given the uncertainties of litigation. Having a [suitably qualified and experienced mediator] outline the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s case may cause one or both of the parties to modify their settlement positions. Alternatively, if a strong case is put forward where ability to recover is in issue, creative repayment solution might be successfully canvassed.

[42]      A belief that there is little room for flexibility and no major concessions … will be made does not act to render the [mediation] process futile. ...
...
[43]      Even if the parties are unable to reach a settlement, this does not mean that attendance at the [mediation] has been “futile”. Multiple other benefits may be obtained. ... The parties may be able to narrow down or agree [on issues] during the [mediation] process. At the very least, getting together to refine the legal issues and plan the next court steps can also result in time and cost savings. A good faith commitment to a process that may ultimately resolve the dispute, or shorten trial time and reduce heavy trial costs is never a futile endeavor.
[17]         I agree that settlement of the claims in this case may confront formidable obstacles. However, after participating in dozens of mediations in more than 30 years of practice at the bar before joining the bench, I agree with and endorse the observations made in the Kossovan case.
[18]         The beauty of mediation lies in its confidentiality and flexibility. With the assistance of a skilled mediator, the parties are free to speak to each other directly and to frankly express their concerns and interests without fear of prejudicing the litigation should the matter not settle. That is to be encouraged. Empathy and apology can and often does play a powerful role. Seemingly intractable positions become less so. The legal issues framed in the pleadings frequently do not reflect the real interests or concerns motivating the litigants. Creative remedies not available to the court can be forged to bridge differences. Important relationships can be repaired.
In reference to the dispute before him, Mr. Justice Kent reasoned:

[19]         In this case, the Matsqui seek declaratory relief respecting a perceived aboriginal right protected and preserved by the Constitution. This is not the sort of remedy that is readily available in a mediation process. They undoubtedly know this, yet they have initiated the mediation nonetheless. Presumably they believe there is some basis for settling the claim available. It may have little to do with the formal legal relief sought in the litigation. One cannot help but ask what do the parties have to lose by confidentially exchanging and explaining perspectives and interests? If nothing else, perhaps some accommodations and efficiencies may be reached regarding evidence or other trial process that may reduce mutual inconvenience and cost. At best, some sort of creative resolution in principle may emerge, albeit subject to later ratification by superiors if necessary. At worst, the case will simply proceed to trial in a couple months’ time with an interim “loss” of one or two days’ effort.

Saturday, July 25, 2015

World War I Probate


Kimberly Wallis gave me a copy of a grant of probate from the United Kingdom dated October 28th, 1914. The process for obtaining a grant of probate appears to have been very efficient in those days, as the deceased had died just 23 days earlier, on October 5, 1914.

What was most striking about the grant was the page stapled to it, which read:

This Grant is made upon the condition that no portion of the assets shall be distributed or paid during the War to any beneficiary or creditor who is a German or Austro-Hungarian subject wherever resident, or to any one on his behalf, or to or on behalf of any person resident in Germany or Austria-Hungary, of whatever nationality, without the express sanction of the Crown, acting through the Treasury; and if any distribution or payment is made contrary to this condition the Grant of Probate or Letters of Administration will be forthwith revoked.

Upon an application to the Solicitor to the Treasury there will be no difficulty in proper cases in obtaining the sanction of the Treasury to the payment of a moderate sum out of assets to beneficiary or creditors who are German or Austro-Hungarian subjects resident in this country at the commencement of the War and during the War.

Sunday, July 19, 2015

Amendments to Probate Rules Include Provision for Substitution of Personal Representative on Death


As I wrote acouple of weeks ago, the probate rules were amended effective July 1, 2015. Among the changes is a new provision dealing with the procedure for appointing a new personal representative (executor or administrator) when the deceased’s personal representative dies before completing the administration of the estate.

The new provision, Rule 25-14 (1.2) reads as follows:

Substitution of personal representative in the event of death

(1.2)If a deceased's personal representative dies, a person may apply in accordance with Part 8, subject to any directions given by the court under subrule (8) of this rule, to be substituted as the personal representative by filing 

(a) a copy of the death certificate of the personal representative,

(b) an affidavit setting out the request to be substituted as the personal representative and specifying the right to be appointed as personal representative on the basis that the person is one of the following:

(i)   the alternate executor;

(ii)   entitled to apply for administration of the estate in accordance with section 130 of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act;

(iii)   entitled to apply for administration with will annexed in accordance with section 131 of that Act, and
 
 
(c) an affidavit confirming delivery of the affidavit referred to in paragraph (b) to
(i)   every person who was entitled to notice under the original application, and
(ii)   any executors who
(A)  did not receive notice of the original application, and
(B)  have an equal or greater right to apply to be the personal representative.

 
As I read this provision together with Part 8 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, which deals with how applications are made to court, in most cases, a person applying under this section (or his or her lawyer) will need to appear for a hearing before a judge or court master. Part 8 contemplates a hearing unless the order is one that may be made without notice or by consent of all of the parties. In most cases there will be persons to whom notice must be given, and it is not always convenient to have all parties sign a consent order, or there may be minors or others without capacity to consent.

Unless contested, the hearing should be straightforward, but with the need to appear, and wait in court while other matters are heard, the expense may be higher than if the order could be obtained by desk order (without a hearing).

The application may be made by an alternate executor, if the first named executor dies after probate. It may also be necessary if there are two executors, but he will provides that if one dies, and alternate is appointed. If there is no alternate named, then another person may apply to be appointed as an administrator.

Section 130 of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act sets out the order of priority for appointment as an administrator if there is no will, while section 131 sets out the order of priority if there is a will, but there is no executor or alternate executor willing and able to act. These sections are as follows:

Priority among applicants — intestate estate

130  If a person dies without a will, the court may grant administration of the deceased person's estate to one or more of the following persons in the following order of priority:

(a) the spouse of the deceased person or a person nominated by the spouse;

(b) a child of the deceased person having the consent of a majority of the children of the deceased person;

(c) a person nominated by a child of the deceased person if that person has the consent of a majority of the deceased person's children; 

(d) a child of the deceased person not having the consent of a majority of the deceased person's children; 

(e) an intestate successor other than the spouse or child of the deceased person, having the consent of the intestate successors representing a majority in interest of the estate, including the intestate successor who applies for a grant of administration; 

(f) an intestate successor other than the spouse or child of the deceased person, not having the consent of the intestate successors representing a majority in interest of the estate, including the intestate successor who applies for a grant of administration; 

(g) any other person the court considers appropriate to appoint, including, without limitation, and subject to the Public Guardian and Trustee's consent, the Public Guardian and Trustee. 

Priority of applicants — administration with will annexed

131  If a person dies leaving a will, and the executor named in the will renounces executorship or is unable or unwilling to apply for a grant of probate, or if no executor is named in the will, the court may grant administration with will annexed to one or more of the following persons in the following order of priority: 

(a) a beneficiary who applies having the consent of the beneficiaries representing a majority in interest of the estate, including the applicant;

(b) a beneficiary who applies not having the consent of the beneficiaries representing a majority in interest of the estate;

(c) any other person the court considers appropriate to appoint, including, without limitation, and subject to the Public Guardian and Trustee's consent, the Public Guardian and Trustee.

Finally, if the “chain of executorship applies” (see my previous post), it will not be necessary for anyone to apply under Rule 25-14 (1.2). If the executor dies after receiving an estate grant, but before completing the estate administration, and the will does not name any other executor or alternate executor willing and able to apply, the executor of the now deceased executor may complete the administration. The executor’s executor will need to probate the will of the deceased executor.

The authority of the executor’s executor is confirmed in section 145 of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act:

Executor of deceased executor

145  If a deceased will-maker was an executor of a person who died before the will-maker, the executor of the deceased will-maker has all the rights, powers, rights of action and liabilities of the deceased will-maker with respect to the estate of the deceased person.

Saturday, July 11, 2015

2015 Canadian Conference on Elder Law



The Canadian Center for Elder Law together with the Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia are presenting a two day conference: The Journey of Aging – the Law and Beyond. The conference will be held on Thursday and Friday, November 12 and 13, 2015 at the Pan Pacific Hotel, 999 Canada Place, Vancouver, B.C. Here is the description from the CCEL website: 

DAY 1: Connecting Across Discipline and Geography
Join practitioners from law, social work, health care, finance, non-profit and other sectors from across the country and around the world to talk about the challenges and issues involved in working with older adults.

DAY 2: Key Practice Challenges and Hot Topics in Legal Practice
Explore issues engaged in powers of attorney and substitute decision-making, health care decision-making and end of life care, mental capacity and dementia, elder abuse and neglect, and other challenging subjects that arise in representing older adults and their families.

Keynote speakers will include:
  • Isobel Mackenzie, BC’s Senior’s Advocate
  • Dr. Andrew Wister, Chair, National Senior’s Council
  • Barb MacLean, Chair, BC Council to Reduce Elder Abuse
Confirmed presenters:
  • Catherine Romanko, BC Public Guardian and Trustee
  • Andrew S. MacKay, Alexander, Holburn, Beaudin and Lang
  • Geoffrey W. White, Geoffrey W. White Law Corporation
  • Diedre J. Herbert, McLellan Herbert
  • John-Paul Boyd, Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family
  • Anna Laing, Fasken Martineau
  • Kimberly A. Whaley, Whaley Estate Litigation
  • Honourable Marion J. Allan, Clark Wilson LLP
  • Barbara Buchanan, Law Society of BC
Panels will include:
  • Advance health care planning—implications of the Bentley decision
  • Debate: Would a national power of attorney registry help reduce elder financial abuse?
  • Update on guardianship law in BC—what’s happening one year after legislative change
  • Who do you call when you suspect elder abuse? Introducing the new BC decision tree
  • Physician assisted suicide after Carter—where do we go from here?
  • Late life separation and divorce
  • Dementia and client competency: practice tips, communication strategies and ethical issues
  • The when and how of mental capacity assessments

Registration information is available on the CLEBC site here.

Sunday, July 05, 2015

Changes to Probate Rules and Forms Effective July 1, 2015


Changes to the Probate Rules and Forms were brought into effect on July 1, 2015—that’s right, four days ago. I had heard that changes were coming, but I didn’t know what they were until very recently. The online consolidated Supreme Court Civil Rules has not as of today been updated to include the changes, but you can find them in B.C. Reg. 103, 2015 here.

There is a significant change to the procedure for making applications relating to estate grants in Rule 25-14. Under the rules as they stood before the amendments, many types of applications would be commenced by either a notice of application, if an estate file is already opened, or by requisition if nothing has been filed in relation to the estate. The types of proceedings to which this applies includes some potentially very contentious disputes such as passing over an executor. A requisition is a request to the court, and there are no rules saying who must be served, what they file to oppose it, or how long they have to file. Starting a contested proceeding by requisition doesn’t make sense.

Fortunately, as amended Rule 25-14 will now provide that where there has been an application for an estate grant, an application may be made by notice of application, but if there has not been an estate grant, then you may start a proceeding by a petition. In some cases, such as passing over an executor, it will be mandatory to start the proceeding by a petition rather than by a requisition. This makes a lot more sense.

Here are the amendments to Rule 25-14 (1) and (1.1), with deletions crossed out, and additions underlined:


(1)A person If there has been an application for estate grant, a person may apply in accordance with Part 8, or, if nothing has been filed in relation to the estate, may, despite Rule 2-1 (1) and (2) (a) and (b), apply by requisition in Form P41, for an order

(a) under Rule 25-2 (14),

(b) granting administration with or without will annexed in circumstances in which the right to be appointed as the administrator is contested,

(c) revoking an authorization to obtain estate information or estate grant or an authorization to obtain resealing information or the resealing of a foreign grant,

(d) subject to subrule (1.2), removing or substituting a personal representative or, if different, the holder of an authorization to obtain estate information or the holder of an authorization to obtain resealing information,

(e) discharging a personal representative or, if different, the holder of an authorization to obtain estate information or the holder of an authorization to obtain resealing information,

(f) passing over an executor,

(g) appointing an administrator of an estate under section 132 of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act,

(h) removing or renewing a notice of dispute,

(i) that a foreign grant of probate or administration not be resealed,

(j) requiring security for the administration of an estate,

(k) varying or substituting security for the administration of an estate,

(l) directing that security be assigned to a person named in the order,

(m) respecting production, delivery or filing of

(i)   a testamentary document,

(ii)   a certified or notarial copy of an authorization to obtain estate information,

(iii)   an estate grant,

(iv)   an authorization to obtain resealing information, or

(v)   a resealed foreign grant,

(n) Repealed. [B.C. Reg. 44/2014, Sch. 1, s. 12 (c).]

(o) for the passing of accounts,

(p) fixing and approving the remuneration of a personal representative, or

(q) subject to subrule (2), respecting any other matter concerning

(i)   an authorization to obtain estate information,

(ii)   an authorization to obtain resealing information,

(iii)   a grant of probate,

(iv)   a grant of administration with or without will annexed,

(v)   an ancillary grant,

(vi)   a resealing, or

(vii)   the office of personal representative,

other than a question or matter covered by Rule 2-1 (2) (c) or (d).

How to apply by petition for orders

(1.1) If there has been no application for estate grant, a person may, with notice, apply by petition to the court for an order

(a) passing over an executor,

(b) appointing an administrator of the estate under section 132 of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act,

(c) respecting production, delivery or filing of a testamentary document, and

(d) subject to subrule (2), respecting any other matter referred to in subrule (I).